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Abstract
All population projections are based in one form or another on expert judgement about
likely future trends, structural continuity, etc. Although experts are clearly superior to
lay people in their field of expertise, when it comes to forecasting they may make
serious errors and can be as ignorant as anybody. In the context of expert-based
probabilistic population projections, this issue is receiving even more attention. In this
paper we argue that information about the future cannot be true for the reason that it is
being presented by an acknowledged authority (institution or person), nor is it
acceptable to resolve scientific issues on the ground of voting or concert. As an
alternative we propose the concept of argument-based expert opinion. Under this
approach any structural and trend assumption needs to be based on explicit
argumentation rather than implicit judgement.
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1New Developments in the Methodology of Expert- and
Argument-Based Probabilistic Population Forecasting
Wolfgang Lutz, Pertti Saariluoma, Warren C. Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov
1 Introduction
There is a large and continuing literature on the use of expert opinion in forecasting.
The UN, the US Bureau of the Census, the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA), and most national statistical offices use expert opinion as a basis for
their population forecasts. The World Bank uses a composite of estimated equations and
expert opinion as inputs into their forecasts. Nevertheless, the forecasts and associated
documents from these four international and most national organizations make no
reference to the substantial literature on the use of expert opinion. Recently, an
interesting debate has arisen in demography concerning the role of experts and expert
knowledge in probabilistic population projections. Thus far, this debate has also ignored
the larger literature. The thesis of this paper is that demographic forecasting should no
longer stand alone. It has a great deal to learn from other forecasting experiences. In
particular, the recent debate in demography about the use of experts in making
probabilistic projections can best be understood in the context of the larger literature.
We set the stage in Section 2 by discussing why expert opinion has recently
become an issue in population forecasting. A good summary of the current state of the
art in forecasting is Armstrong (forthcoming). It contains 138 principles that cover all
aspects of the forecasting process. In Section 3, we discuss twenty of those principles
that pertain most closely to the use of experts in making probabilistic population
forecasts. In Section 4, we present the foundation of a new approach to population
forecasting that we call “expert- and argument-based probabilistic population
forecasting.” We are very far from having all the answers, but at this point we believe
that even systematically investigating a formal forecasting framework for population is
a step in the right direction. An understanding of the nature of expertise is essential for
the proper application of expert opinion in forecasting. We consider this in Section 5. In
Section 6, we discuss problems in getting knowledge from experts. With the new
framework in mind, the recent debate on the use of expert opinion versus time series
analysis in the production of prediction intervals is revisited in Section 7. Section 8
contains concluding remarks which point toward how the new approach could be
implemented in practice.
22 Why Expert Judgment Has Recently Become an Issue in
Population Forecasting
For decades most population forecasts made by national and international agencies have
been based on the judgment of experts. This approach has been uncontroversial until
recently, when an interesting debate has arisen concerning the role of experts and expert
judgment in probabilistic population forecasting. Although the questions involved in
this debate concern any kind of scientific forecasting–not only probabilistic and not only
in the field of population–the competition of alternative approaches to probabilistic
population forecasting has contributed to a sharper focus on some of the fundamental
issues concerning the role of expert judgment.
A brief review of the debate is helpful in putting it into perspective. In Lutz,
Sanderson and Scherbov (1997) we presented the first fully probabilistic projections of
the world population by 12 major regions, which gives uncertainty intervals not only for
population size but also for age distribution. It is based on thousands of simulations
drawing from expert defined uncertainty distributions for fertility, mortality and
migration in each of the regions. These uncertainty distributions had been derived from
an interactive discussion process among a group of experts whose views and arguments
are made explicit in a 500 page volume entitled The Future Population of the World.
What Can We Assume Today? (Lutz 1996).
Tuljapurkar (1997) wrote a short commentary in which he supports the
importance of probabilistic population projections but at the same time raises some
doubts about the treatment of short term variations in vital rates and about the
usefulness of expert opinion. These comments are based on some of the pioneering
work of Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) in developing a stochastic population projection
model for the United States, which combines exogenous (expert) assumptions about the
future trends in the demographic components with stochastic short term variations
derived from the statistical analysis of past US time series drawing on earlier time series
models on fertility (Lee 1993) and mortality (Lee and Carter 1992). Other roots of
probabilistic population projections date back to Keyfitz (1985) and Stoto (1983),
Pflaumer (1988) and Alho and Spencer (1985) suggesting alternative approaches based
on ex-post error analysis, expert opinion and time series analysis, respectively.
An answer to some of the questions concerning the validity of expert opinion and
the importance of the explicit modeling of short term fluctuations versus long term
trends is given in Lutz and Scherbov (1998). They present various kinds of sensitivity
analyses by empirically comparing the autoregressive (AR) processes advocated by time
series proponents to a piece-wise linear probabilistic approach similar to the one
suggested by Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov (1997). This paper demonstrates that the
model is rather robust with respect to minor modifications of expert views, and that the
piece-wise linear probabilistic approach does not systematically underestimate the
variance relative to the autoregressive method as has been suggested by Lee (personal
correspondence). Lutz and Scherbov also discuss the practical usefulness and empirical
feasibility, and come to the conclusion that the expert-based probabilistic approach is
the only one applicable in settings with very limited time series data. It is structurally
closer to the currently dominant method of projection variants, and has therefore the
advantage of an evolutionary development.
The latest round of discussion on the issue of experts versus time series data is
documented in a special supplement of Population and Development Review entitled
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by Lee and Lutz, Sanderson, Scherbov. A careful reading of both papers makes it clear
that actually there are two independent questions that need to be separated for a better
understanding and further progress in the field:
1. the choice of the process used in forecasting vital rates, autoregressive versus
piece-wise linear.
2. the role of expert judgment in defining both the trend and the variance of the vital
rates.
These are largely independent questions and it just happens to be the case due to
intellectual traditions that authors who put more weight on expert judgment chose the
piece-wise linear approach, while those relying more heavily on time series analysis
chose the random walk as the preferred process. As shown by Lutz and Scherbov (1998)
the choice of random walk as a process is also fully compatible with expert judgement
as the basis for the assumed variance.
The choice of the process is (ironically) also a matter of expert judgement and to
some degree a matter of taste. We agree with Lee that a random walk probably comes
closer to the empirical nature of the real process, where we do observe irregular ups and
downs. On the other hand, probabilistic scenarios may be a good and robust
compromise between the current practice of completely disregarding probabilistic
aspects and fully stochastic models because they are more in the tradition of current
practice and seem to be easier to digest as a next step for the broad community of
practitioners in statistical offices. The choice of the process only makes a minor
difference for the outcome and is not the key issue.
The key issue, in the broadest sense, is whether experts can appropriately be used
to provide the inputs needed for making probabilistic projections. There is a narrower
issue as well. It is whether the methodology of eliciting expert opinion in Lutz,
Sanderson, and Scherbov (1997) is the best available one, or whether there are
improvements that can be made. Our positions on these issues are clear. Experts can
appropriately be used to provide the inputs needed for making probabilistic projections,
by using the argument-based approach discussed in Section 4. To our knowledge this
methodology has never been used in the literature, not even in Lutz, Sanderson, and
Scherbov (1997). It is the next evolutionary step in our research on expert-based
probabilistic projections.
3 Learning From the Literature on Forecasting
Armstrong (forthcoming) summarizes what is known about forecasting in 138
principles.1 In his section “Implementing Judgmental Methods,” he gives the following
advice: “In general, you need to ask the right people the right questions.” Among the
principles Armstrong lists in this section are: (1) “Pretest the questions you intend to use
to elicit judgments forecasts,” (2) “Frame questions in alternative ways,” (3) “Ask
experts to justify their forecasts in writing,” and (4) “Obtain forecasts from
heterogeneous experts.” Combining forecasts is one of the best ways of improving
forecast accuracy. Among the principles pertaining to the combination of forecasts,
                                                
1
 Each is numbered and comes with brief comments under the rubrics description, purpose, conditions,
strength of evidence, and source of evidence.
4Armstrong includes: (5) “Combine forecasts from approaches that differ,” (6) “Use
many approaches (or forecasters), preferably at least five,” and (7) “Use formal
procedures to combine forecasts.”
In his section on the evaluation of forecasting methods, Armstrong includes as
principles: (8) “Describe potential biases by forecasters,” (9) “Provide full disclosure of
methods,” and (10) “Compare forecasts made by different methods.” There is an
important set of principles concerning the assessment of uncertainty. They include: (11)
“Estimate prediction intervals,” (12) “Use objective procedures to assess uncertainty
and to estimate explicit prediction intervals (PIs),” (13) “Write out reasons why the
forecasts might be wrong,” (14) “Obtain good feedback about the accuracy of forecasts
and the reasons why errors occurred,” (15) “Combine prediction intervals from
alternative forecasting methods,” (16) “Use safety factors to adjust for overconfidence
in the PIs, which are typically too narrow,” and (17) “Do not assess uncertainty in a
traditional group meeting.” Principle (16) is based on evidence in Arkes (forthcoming)
and Chatfield (forthcoming) that prediction intervals produced by both quantitative and
judgmental techniques tend to be too narrow. Principle (12) is based on the possibility
that judgmental prediction intervals might be the narrower of the two. Armstrong
himself calls Principle (12) “speculative.” One simulation study concerned with the
accuracy of population forecasts found that time series methods often produced
prediction intervals that were considerably larger than the true ones (see Sanderson
1995). Finally, in his section on learning, Armstrong includes the following principles
among others: (18) “Consider the use of adaptive forecasting models,” (19) “Seek
feedback about forecasts,” and (20) “Establish a formal review process for forecasting
methods.”
Very few of these 20 Principles are applied in population forecasting. A good
population forecasting methodology does not necessarily agree with all those Principles,
but it should seriously address the larger literature on forecasting. There is no good
reason for demographic forecasters to remain so isolated from the larger forecasting
community.
4 Towards a Methodology of Expert- and Argument-Based
Probabilistic Population Forecasting
When information is elicited from experts and turned into probabilistic population
forecasts, three groups of experts with different kinds of expertise are needed. We call
the people in the relatively larger group, from which information is elicited, panel (or
primary) experts. We call the people in the relatively smaller group, who receive the
information and process it to form prediction intervals, implementation (or secondary)
experts. Design (or tertiary) experts are those who design and supervise the process by
which information flows between the two groups.
The job of the design expert is a difficult one. Using experts in forecasting is in
many respects meta-scientifically problematic. There are a few obvious argumentation
fallacies, which must be avoided. Unfortunately, sufficient attention has not always
been paid to these phenomena, so that in classic Delphi, for example, one can
sometimes find argumentatively non-optimal practices (Hahn et al. 1999; Linstone and
Turoff 1975; Martino 1983; Parenté and Anderson Parenté 1987) that lead to serious
biases and errors and thus decrease the quality of expert-based predictions.
5The first argumentative fallacy hidden in Delphi-methods is the tacit acceptance
of an authority argument. Experts normally have substantial authority and this is the
reason they are used in forecasting. It is easy to think that any piece of knowledge
presented by an expert should be incorporated into argumentation because it has been
presented by an expert. However, no piece of knowledge can be true, because it is
presented by an acknowledged authority (Naylor 1997). If authority argument would be
acceptable, Aristotle’s theory of the heart as a seat of mind would presumably still be
valid. The acceptance of expert opinions as arguments neglects the limits of expertise.
Experts may easily make errors. Therefore, in forecasting, it is important that any piece
of the expert’s knowledge is assessed on the basis of the arguments that he or she gives
to support the presented view, and not on the basis of the presenter’s personal expertise.
The contents and power of arguments decide if the piece of knowledge is accepted into
a model of prediction.
The second problem arises when several experts have different views. In this case,
it is easy to think that voting or some other group decision process provides a
sufficiently reliable basis for forecasting. Again, it is unacceptable to resolve scientific
issues on the basis of voting or other group decision process. The majority argument is
an equally elementary fallacy in argumentation as the authority argument. Truth cannot
be determined by majority vote. It must be resolved on the basis of the arguments.
Therefore, in principle, all voting-based methods of forecasting are wrong. If we had
accepted scientific knowledge based on voting, we would never have changed our views
about the solar system. Practically all new scientific ideas are in some sense against the
current. Science is a system of truths, and new truths do not belong to the system of old
truths, before they have been incorporated into it. In fact ever since Kuhn’s (1962)
famous model of scientific advancement, it has been generally known that one must
make a distinction between anomalies and accepted truths. Anomalies are findings
which do not fit together with the prevailing theory. Yet anomalies can entail important
pieces of truths, but still be outside the generally accepted theoretical thinking.
Consequently, anomalies will easily have an effect on voting-type predictions in a very
late stage.
The problem with majority and authority arguments is that they make self-
correction and falsification impossible, and without constant self-correction, there is no
genuine science. Unless one is able to test the arguments, one cannot have any
mechanism of self-correction (Popper 1959). However, to test an expert’s knowledge
one must know the presented arguments behind the beliefs. In forecasting, the actual
events will emerge much later than the models and this is why arguments are so
important to their testing. It is rarely possible to falsify a forecast without falsifying the
arguments, because the falsification by showing the outcome incorrectly is often too
late.
Let’s assume that an expert gives a value of 1.3 for German TFR in 2025. How
can we falsify this knowledge as an argument, if we think that the reason and
justification for its correctness is that it has been presented by an expert? The basic fact
does not change whatever happens. An expert has put it forward and it stays, unless she
herself corrects the fact. So, if he or she remains convinced of the value whatever
happens, the argument does not change. Of course, it is not rare that experts do not
change their opinions. Many of Darwin’s opponents, for example, never changed their
minds, but after their death younger generation scientists accepted Darwin’s views.
6It is one thing to take an expert’s estimate when there is some scientific
argumentation for it, and another to accept it, because it has been put forward by an
expert. Accepting that TFR will be 1.3 because of contraceptive improvements is a valid
argument. Accepting the value because an expert said so is not science. You can always
test the first fact and discuss it. You have no possibility to discuss the value, if you
accept the expert’s opinion as a valid argument. This is apparently a small difference,
but in fact, it is essential. Opinions are simply not arguments, because one cannot
possibly test them.
Expert opinions as arguments are problematic for several other reasons. The bases
of expert opinions are not public. However, in science all the factors that affect the
outcome of argumentation must be visible to anybody, so that this anybody can
critically think them. Publicity is an absolute demand for science, because without it no
self-correction is possible (Popper 1959). Experts may always have conscious or
unconscious reasons for their opinions. They are people and they have political, cultural
or personal values. This may affect their estimates. Unless, the arguments are absolutely
public for all, it is impossible for the scientific community to test or critically analyze
the arguments behind forecasts.
The core of all problems with some earlier practices of using experts in
forecasting is their inherent subjectivity. They, in one or another way, incorporate
expert opinions into their web of arguments and miss a subtle conceptual difference
between expert opinions and knowledge. Expert opinions need not be argued, but their
knowledge must be. Knowledge is objective only if its truth does not depend on the will
of any human being. A proposition P is not necessarily true just because an expert
believes it, even in the case when P is really true. If I believe that my lottery coupon will
win and I indeed win, I still cannot say that I knew that the ticket would win. I just made
a lucky guess. Lucky guesses are not knowledge, because they are not justified by
acceptable arguments. From a scientific point of view, the lucky guesses are not
sufficient, but arguments and justification via arguments are decisive. Science is thus
knowledge about truths, reasons and arguments. This means that only arguments can
make expert knowledge something more than simply lucky guesses.
To avoid the problems associated with the incorrect use of expert knowledge, the
design experts must find a new type of elicitation mechanism based on expert
knowledge instead of expert opinion. The latter are argumentatively all too weak to
safeguard forecasts against biases and errors. Even the best can err, and if there is no
objective mechanism for securing expert knowledge, the forecasting models made
following expert opinions cannot be effectively tested. For these reasons a two-stage
procedure for the use of expert knowledge will be suggested here. The main idea is to
allow the incorporation of argumentation into expert-based forecasting.
In this model there are two basic stages. In the first stage, which can be called
constructing, the design and implementation experts collect all possible views from the
panel experts with the arguments supporting the opinions. In the second stage, termed
proving, the arguments are analyzed by the implementation experts; the relevance of
knowledge and arguments are discussed; and finally, the knowledge is incorporated into
the theory or model, if the arguments are valid. This two-stage model should ensure that
the argumentation is theoretically valid, but also give a much wider and accurate base of
information for modeling, compared to the intuitions of the experts alone. The main
thing is that the publicity and openness of the procedure makes scientific self-correction
7possible. Demography deals with all too important issues to allow subjectivism in the
form of non-openly argued frameworks.
The suggested way of using expert knowledge in forecasting means first, that
panel experts are used to collect as many rational points of view as possible for the use
of forecasting. Second, expertise as such is not used as an argument, but the arguments
experts present are put under critical scrutiny and incorporated into the model and used
in forecasting when it makes sense.
The three groups of experts (panel, implementation, and design experts) play very
different roles and need very different kinds of expertise. The panel experts are needed
for arguments about the likely demographic future. They should include people from a
wide variety of fields, as long as they bring informed arguments about the future
developments and how they could affect population change. If, for example, there were
a significant probability that a massive meteor would collide with the Earth within the
forecast period, astronomers should certainly be among the group of panel experts.
Implementation experts need to be able to evaluate the arguments proposed by the panel
experts and turn them into probabilistic forecasts. They do not need to include people
with a deep understanding of every field. Implementation experts can call upon other
experts to aid them in evaluating arguments. Because they need to be able to take
arguments as inputs and turn them into demographic outputs, implementation experts
are likely to come from demography, sociology, economics, and other related
disciplines. Design experts are likely to come from disciplines such as cognitive
psychology, forecasting, and sociology, guided, of course, by demographers. Expert-
and argument-based forecasting is an inherently interdisciplinary business.
5 What is Expertise?
The discussion about the use of expert knowledge and its use in demography has seldom
paid attention to the nature of expertise. However, a clear analysis of expertise is very
helpful in constructing appropriate procedures for using experts in forecasting. In any
domain, all the people are not equally expert, but the level of expertise varies (Chase
and Simon 1973; de Groot 1965; Ericsson and Delaney 1998; Ericsson and Lehman
1996). There are high-level experts such as grand masters in chess, and less skilled like
masters or novices. Normally, the highest level of skills are achieved after ten years of
practice, and even child prodigies have worked this long in the field before reaching the
highest levels of expertise. In the literature, this phenomenon, which has so
systematically been observed, has been termed the “ten-years-rule” (Hayes 1981;
Ericsson and Lehman 1996).
The measurable changes in an expert’s performance are very stable and
systematic. Experts are much faster in attentional and motor tasks, and they normally
discriminate targets much more accurately (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995; Saariluoma
1985). However, their general attentional capacity need not be any different from
novices. In addition to perceptual and motor tasks, experts are superior in recall and
recognition tasks, and also problem-solving tasks (Chase and Simon 1973; Ericsson and
Kintsch 1995; Ericsson and Lehman 1996; de Groot 1965; Saariluoma 1985, 1995).
Expertise is also domain specific, which means that a person can be an expert in some
issues, but a totally normal person in all other respects (Chase and Simon 1973;
Ericsson and Delaney 1999; Ericsson and Kintsch 1995; Ericsson and Lehman 1996;
Vicente 1988; Vicente and Wang 1998).
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frequently than novices, but they still err (Saariluoma 1992, 1995). In the literature, it is
very easy to find cases in which experts have made serious errors in forecasting. A
specialist predicted that “when the Paris world exhibition closes, the electric light will
close with it, and no more will be heard of it.” The chairman of the board of a large
business manufacturer predicted in 1943: “I think there is a world market for about five
computers” (Cerf and Navasky 1984). Given our goal of improving forecasting, it is
good to understand why experts err.
There are many explanatory factors for an expert’s errors. One is that their basic
capacity of attention and memory is the same as that of a novice. Tasks may simply be
all too complex and surpass their limited capacity, causing various types of errors
(Johnson-Laird 1983; Reason 1990). Another explanation for an expert’s errors is that
their basic thought processes are not so different from the ones of novices. An expert’s
highest level thought structures are the same as those of novices. This means that
experts can be biased by normal non-task specific illusions (Armstrong 1979). It is also
quite possible that experts have wrong presuppositions; these presuppositions lead them
to incorrect and ineffective problem representation (Saariluoma 1992, 1995). In short,
experts can easily surpass the limits of their expertise. The risk of such problems is
naturally largest with unknown future issues. The overconfidence that experts
sometimes exhibit in their own opinions might be an example of this. For some experts,
forecasting future demographic variables might be within their domain of expertise, but
estimating the uncertainty of their forecasts might lie outside it.
Although the idea of using expert knowledge in forecasting is clear in theory,
there are many practical problems in constructing expert-based forecasts, which one
cannot leave outside the discussion. Even though the ultimate proof of argumentation is
independent of the experts who have provided the knowledge, it is for practical reasons
very important that experts really provide as much of their knowledge as possible.
To foresee problems and to think of possible solutions for them, it is important to
use psychological methods and knowledge about experts. This is new ground. There is
no direct knowledge about the practical problems associated with constructing
argumentative models. Nevertheless, from the experiences from earlier expert-based
models for forecasting and the information we have about constructing expert systems,
for example, it is possible to foresee some of the practical issues that must be resolved.
Some of the problems are associated with defining expertise and getting knowledge
from experts. The rest are social psychological, and their origin is in group processes.
It is perhaps the most logical to begin with the practical issues arising from the
determination of expertise. We do not have much knowledge about this, but in the
psychology of computing, it has been considered in some depth. When working with
expert knowledge, one has to decide who is an expert, in which issues he or she can be
an expert, and what is the level of expertise. Without being careful in defining the type
and the real competence of experts, it is easy to make illusory attributions. Even experts
themselves may incorrectly define their competence areas, because the borders of
competence are very difficult to define objectively in ill-defined domains.
One source of problems in measuring expertise is that expertise is domain specific
and domains are normally wide. This means that a person can be a specialist in some
sub-domain, but much less experienced in a sub-domain just next to the area of his or
her main expertise. An expert on migration between the southwestern USA and Mexico
9might be ignorant of the details of migration within the countries of Southern Africa.
With respect to the likely future path of mortality, both may be as ignorant as a lay
person. For these kind of reasons, it is very important to pay attention to the
specifications of expertise.
Defining expertise is very easy in some task environments. Chess players and
other sports people have relatively well-developed rating systems (Elo 1978). The main
principle of the rating systems is quite clear: The stronger the opponent one is able to
beat, the more the rating of a player is increased, and the weaker the player one loses to,
the more points he or she will have deducted. When the outcome is as objective as it is
in sports, the determination of expertise on the basis of rating is very efficient.
Unfortunately, most of the professional domains on the limits of expertise may be very
unclear.
Sometimes useful single measures of expertise cannot be found and one has to use
several criteria. The time in the field, productivity, academic performances, and peer
assessments can, for example, be used as the basis of evaluation. However, with all of
these criteria it is impossible to reach such intermediate scale accuracy, which is typical
of well-defined domains like chess. The time in the field is not an absolute measure,
because experts with the same background may substantially vary in their competence.
When comparing computer programmers with the same schooling, substantial
differences have been found in their efficiency to produce code (Brooks 1980). Another
problem is that people who have been in the field a long time have not necessarily done
the required tasks, but have rather been in administrative tasks. Yet the time in the field
is reasonable criterion, if it is used in a sensible manner and the possibly inappropriate
preconditions have been taken into account. The differences between medium-level and
high-level experts are normally rather large, and especially the differences between
experts and novices are very striking.
A rough way of defining experts is academic schooling. It is normally better to
take people who have academic degrees in the field than outsiders. However, academic
fields are large and people specialized. It is not clear that an academic background in
demography makes somebody a specialist, unless that person has really worked in the
field. On the other hand, a sociologist or statistician who has really been working a long
time with demographic issues may easily have the competence of an expert.
Productivity might also be a criterion. Even if people have relatively similar
backgrounds, more productive people might have gained a better level of expertise
because their motivation is higher. However, even here many sources of errors can be
found. If one works with non-standard or otherwise more difficult problems, the
quantitative productivity is a senseless way of assessing competence or motivation.
Nevertheless, the sensible criteria for collecting a panel of experts should not be
difficult to meet. One must just be cautious of possible loopholes in the selection
process.
One way of approaching the expert panel selection problem is to use peer review.
This means that one asks other demographers who they consider good experts.
However, in computing research, it has been noticed that this method is subjective
(Brooks 1980). The differences in schools, in the quality of personal relations, lapses of
memory and so on may bias judgments. Nevertheless, normally the difference between
high-level experts and medium-level experts can be made in this way.
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In summary, there are several sources of biases in selecting experts for expert
panels, but mostly they need not be devastating. By using multiple criteria, and by
taking into account the possible sources of errors, reasonably effective selection
procedures can be developed. The most important mechanism safeguarding against
errors is, nevertheless, the use of expert knowledge in argumentation. Because the two-
stage model does not take expert knowledge at face value, but builds on arguments,
small errors in the selection of panel members are not so important. It is the weight of
the arguments which decide, and not the level of expertise. One or two medium-level
experts cannot change the final outcome, if their arguments are not strong. On the other
hand, if they present strong arguments, it does not matter that they are not super experts.
The avoidance of subjectivity is one of the major benefits of this model.
6 Obtaining Information From Experts
The goal of collecting expert knowledge is to get as wide and versatile a basis of
information for forecasts as possible. Therefore, each of the used methodologies should
have open elements. It is also important that researchers own a priori conceptions that
do not prevent experts from freely bringing all their points of view, however imaginary,
to the game. Consequently, it is very important to have in the research process elements
which encourage experts to express all imaginable points of view. Possibly some
derivative of brainstorming could be used in the beginning. Developing such a
methodology requires much hard “grass roots level” work. We briefly discuss three
possible approaches, the use of a panel, interviewing, and surveys. Our ideas here are
tentative and suggestive.
One problem with this kind of panel may be to get people who are willing to
commit themselves to this approach. In Delphi one tries to resolve these problems by
using anonymous experts. The number of such specialists need not be large. The main
thing is that they are willing to commit themselves to the process, and that they have a
sufficiently relevant background with respect to the issues that are discussed. Indeed, it
should be possible to look for the most efficient group working techniques.
The major goal of an expert panel is to get as good a view about the relevant
information as possible. One can use several sessions, part of which should be
innovative and brainstorming, and part of which can be more analytical. After the
innovative stages, all presented points could be systematically discussed in groups. If
differences of opinions appear, their backgrounds should be investigated as effectively
as possible. Any antinomy is always a source of possibilities.
It is quite clear that it is difficult to get all the information needed in group
sessions. Therefore, it might be wise to have interviews and even in-depth-interviews.
The goal of these interviews would be to analyze critical issues and the basic intuitions
of the experts. It is important to plan such interviews carefully. They must, on the one
hand, give information about the well-known but problematic points. For example, if a
particular expert sees something important, when others do not, it is important to
understand why. However, it is also important to have openness, so that new types of
factors can be collected. One must also be able to plan hypotheses about the reasons
people have for their thinking, so that one can directly ask questions concerning the
matter.
It is well known that surveys are good, because they allow the collection of
information from a relatively large group of people at a reasonable cost. But it is not
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possible to obtain equally in-depth knowledge with surveys as with interviews and panel
techniques. One can use open questions and other respective ideas to improve their
openness. Nevertheless, if the turnover is reasonable, surveys give a good idea how the
experts think about the important issues in the field.
There are a number of techniques one should take into account concerning how to
organize this kind of research. How to create a suitable atmosphere? How to arrange
questions, what kind of questions should be asked, etc. These details can be left to
further discussion. One important thing to remember: The purpose of this kind of
research is not to get the distribution of ideas in the expert community, but only to get as
many important points of view to be incorporated into the discussion as possible. This
means that issues like sample biases are not important. The only important thing is to
get a good base of arguments for making a model for rational forecasts.
There are some specific problems to be discussed concerning the nature of data.
One can collect from the experts either numeric information or qualitative arguments. In
accessing numeric information, a problem arises because of discrimination thresholds.
People are not normally very accurate with quantitative information. People do not
necessarily take a variation of around 10% very seriously, and they can thus make
substantial errors in judging uncertain sums.
Another problem is that people do not normally remember quantities very
precisely. Confusion is common, especially when the number of digits increases. Thus,
it is easier to remember that a budget is 3.4 million rather than 3,486,196, for example
(Katona 1940). One would imagine that experts are bit better in these kinds of issues,
but experts may quite readily make errors. It is the task of methodology to decrease the
risk of erring. Therefore, it would be good to ask experts to give clear reasons, why they
think that some numeric value will be what they assess it to be. Of course, it is
important that experts are given sufficient background information.
Experts should also evaluate how certain they are about the numbers they give. It
may be that they feel forced to give an answer, although they are very uncertain and are
practically guessing. However, they may also have very good grounds to support their
judgments. In our methodology, uncertainty ranges must also be supported by
argumentation. It may be the case that good arguments about uncertainty are not
produced by the experts in the first round of elicitation. Arguments about uncertainty
may become better articulated after the experts have had some feedback from earlier
rounds, and see the range of ideas put forward by other experts. The main thing is that
reasonable arguments be made concerning the uncertainty of used knowledge.
It is evident that a large part of an expert’s contributions must be qualitative by
nature. Though it is very commonly assumed that quantitative information is hard and
qualitative “soft,” the difference is not absolute. If a forecaster presents a numeric
parameter to an expert for estimation, he or she has already had to decide that this
parameter is important, and that the selection of parameters naturally presupposes
qualitative analysis before quantification. The expert is not given the possibility to
affect the choice of factors. On the other hand, if this is done, the qualitative nature of
the data is obvious. Also, the information about possible phenomena and the
mechanisms associated with these phenomena are information that must be classified as
qualitative.
Qualitative information is thus a special position when methods of population
projections are planned. When the researched phenomena are complex, qualitative
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information is exceptionally valuable, because the selection of essential aspects is a
qualitative decision. All factors incorporated into a model of forecasting belong to the
class of qualitative knowledge. Even causal analysis presupposes qualitative decisions.
Finally, the reasons asked from experts are normally qualitative by nature. Therefore,
one must pay specific attention to the methods of qualitative information gathering with
experts.
The methods of collecting qualitative information are normally quite explicit and
today they are well known (see collection by Denzin and Lincoln 1998). One problem is
that there is relatively little experience about the specific problems of applying
qualitative methods, such as interviews and surveys with experts for solving problems
like forecasting. We need to get more information about the specific characteristics of
expertise in this kind of research situation. Nevertheless, some main principles can be
discussed, even though the literature is relatively small.
Qualitative methodology provides the possibility to investigate issues that cannot
normally be reached by quantitative methods, particularly reasons and mechanisms.
Qualitative research methods have been designed to give information about mental and
cultural contents, beliefs, opinions, interpretations, and intuitions. All of these are
factors that may underlie an expert’s assessment of factors, influencing their judgment
in some context.
It is well known that qualitative data very often provides understanding rather
than explanation. It gives insight into the heart of the matter rather than a clear
explanation why things are as they are. It may simply be that people do not have the
explanation (Hamilton 1994, 1998). Nevertheless, qualitative analyses of data are very
suitable and effective, when the main goal of expertise research is to get the information
about the arguments behind the opinions. These presuppositions are often tacit and
intuitive (Saariluoma 1997). This means that one can best uncover them by means of
deep interviews and group processes.
It is common to see qualitative and quantitative methods as some kind of mutual
contradiction, but this is not necessarily the correct way to understand what they
measure. No quantification is possible without first making a qualitative interpretation
and then assigning a numeric value to the variation of the observed phenomena. Even
measuring length presupposes qualitative analysis. Consequently, qualitative analysis
and investigation, and collecting qualitative information about relevant demographic
factors is the foundation of quantification. However, in forecasting it is often very
important to turn qualitative knowledge collected from experts into quantitative
measures and, therefore, qualitative analysis is not sufficient.
7 The Debate Revisited
With this background we can now revisit the recent debate about the use of experts in
making probabilistic projections. The literature has shown that experts can be
overconfident in the sense that prediction intervals can be too small. There are many
possible reasons for this. It could be that experts have less expertise in forecasting
prediction intervals than they have in forecasting most likely outcomes. The
argumentation-based methodology that we propose does not simply ask experts how
uncertain they are, it requires written (or recorded oral) arguments about the extent of
their uncertainty.
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Argumentation about uncertainty does not have to be elicited in the first round of
information gathering. It seems likely to us that better arguments concerning uncertainty
will appear over subsequent rounds after the experts have seen the arguments made by
the entire group. For example, if strong reasons can be given to defend the position that
life expectancy at birth in some region would be 80 years in 2050, and equally strong
reasons can be given supporting the proposition that it would be 90 years, then the
experts in the group will form their ideas about prediction interval for life expectancy at
birth accordingly.
The group of panel experts includes people with a wide variety of expertise. It
should include people who are more quantitatively oriented, such as time series analysts
and structural modelers, as well as people who are primarily qualitatively oriented, and
many people in between. The group members will make arguments for their points of
view. Time series analysts and structural models could provide estimated equations to
bolster their points of view. Sociologists could provide arguments concerning prediction
intervals based on diffusion theory. Demographers might discuss, for example,
uncertainty in fertility due to changes in the mean age at childbearing.
Environmentalists might discuss uncertainties due to limitations in water supplies.
Ethicists could bring up uncertainties due to the cloning of humans. When arguments
matter (not just one’s own faith in his/her ability to forecast) there is no particular
reason to expect that experts would produce prediction intervals that are systematically
too small or too large.
In order to make our ideas more concrete, it is useful to discuss a real example.
Keilman and Hetlans (1999) used a particular time series model to estimate the 95
percent prediction interval for the total fertility rate (roughly the number of children
ever born to the average woman over her lifetime) of Norway in 2050. That interval lay
between 0.5 and 2.8 children. We cannot accept the Keilman and Hetlans estimate of
the prediction interval for the reason that Keilman and Hetlans are experts. Nor can we
accept their estimate because they used a quantitative method. Their argument, in fact,
has many parts that we must evaluate. It is based primarily on the assumption that their
particular model provides a very good representation of what happened during the
period over which the parameters were estimated, and that it will provide an equally
good representation onwards to the year 2050.
There can be two types of arguments made about their prediction interval, internal
and external. An internal argument deals with their assumptions. For example, someone
might argue that there are many plausible specifications that give very different results.
In this case, Keilman and Hetlans would need to make an argument concerning why the
specification that they chose was the superior one. Indeed the sensitivity of prediction
intervals derived from time series analysis to the exact specification of the model is well
known. Sanderson (1995), for example, showed this in the context of a demographic
simulation experiment.
An external argument would approach the prediction interval from an alternative
perspective. For example, a total fertility rate of 0.5 can be achieved by half the women
in Norway having a single child, while the remaining half remain childless. This would
certainly go well beyond the range of historical observation. There has never been a
place or time where we have seen a situation in which there were no second or higher
order births, not even in urban China, where their one-child family policy is most
strictly enforced. If we would allow half of the women who had a first birth to have a
second one (but no third or higher order births), then a total fertility rate of 0.5 could
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only be observed if two-thirds of all Norwegian women were childless. Can a plausible
argument be made that around two-thirds of all Norwegian women would be childless
by 2050?
De Beer and Alders (1999) used a parity-based approach to derive a 95 percent
prediction interval for the Netherlands in 2050. Their range is between 1.1 and 2.3
children, which is considerably smaller than the prediction interval for Norway
produced in Keilman and Hetlans (1999). Is the fertility of Norwegian women really
that much more uncertain than the fertility of Dutch women? If not, why is Keilman and
Hetlans’ prediction interval so much larger? These are the types of questions that get
resolved through argumentation. No argument can be accepted because of who puts it
forward or because of its methodology. All arguments need to be discussed and, if
possible, tested. The important point that we would like to stress again is that there is no
particular reason why a prediction interval based on arguments should be biased.
8 Concluding Comments
The skeletal methodology that we have presented here is very different from the
standard use of expert opinion in forecasting. We propose a new approach based on
arguments, not opinions. These arguments are derived from a group of panel experts
who have knowledge relevant for the study of population change. Some of them might
be time series modelers, and some might be practitioners of the Delphi method.
Armstrong (forthcoming) suggests that questions be pre-tested and framed in alternative
ways. These techniques will certainly be used in our framework. In the context of our
approach, he recommends that experts report on their arguments in writing. We also
believe that this is a good idea. We also believe that it is important to obtain arguments
from a heterogeneous group of experts.
The essence of our approach is the combination of arguments made by various
experts. It could be that arguments are combined at the level of the inputs into the
forecasts (e.g. total fertility rates, life expectancies at birth, and migration rates) or that
the forecasts based on a variety of arguments are subsequently combined. Our
methodology is open. Full disclosure is one of its fundamental elements. A signature
element of our methodology is that it produces prediction intervals. The overconfidence
of experts is not a problem here because prediction intervals are based on arguments,
not on subjective feelings. Prediction intervals are not produced in meetings where it is
possible for some people to bully others, but through an impersonal approach based on
anonymous arguments. The exact process of generating and evaluating such arguments
needs explicit attention as a research project in its own right. Finally, arguments can be
made stronger or weaker with additional evidence. Our argument-based approach is
inherently adaptive and allows us to learn how to improve our forecasts over time. In
these ways, the new expert- and argument-based methodology is more consistent with
the literature on forecasting than anything currently being done.
Our next step is to perform a pilot projection study with a small group of
volunteers. In dealing with the forecasting of complex phenomena like population
change, there will never be a time when human expertise is not useful. But if we can
replace the emphasis on expert opinion with one based on expert knowledge, we believe
that we will taken a significant step toward improving our forecasts.
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